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1. Percentage of adult subjects producing the
convergence solution 28
2. Percentage of subjects scoring at each of the
three levels of story comparison 31
3. Adult production of story elements (averaged
over two source stories) in recall task 32
4. Adult ratings of usefulness of source stories
. .35
5. Percentage of children who produced the
combining solution 48
6. Children's time to produce the combining
solution 49
7. Percentage of youngest third of children who
produced the combining solution, and time
to solve 53
8. Youngest third of children's production
of story elements (averaged over two source





Analogical transfer is the flexible use of previously
acquired information in a new context or domain. The
mechanisms involved in analogical transfer are often tested
by giving subjects source stories that contain a procedure
known as a solution principle. Transfer is assessed by
ability to use this solution principle to solve a new
problem. Traditionally, the solution principle has been
given in a complete form in that all of the elements
necessary to solve the problem have been explicitly
presented. However, it may not always be necessary to
provide all of the elements of the solution principle. Other
processes, such as the ability to generate inferences, may
allow the subject to derive necessary information. This
experiment examined whether the requirement to generate an
inference about the solution principle affected analogical
problem solving performance. The solution principle was
varied as to whether the action in the principle was
explicitly presented, or only implicit in the source
stories. Performance of both adults and 7-8 years-old
children, using age appropriate materials, was examined.
Review of Literature Related to Analogical Transfer
Problem solving occupies a great deal of one's life. We
are repeatedly confronted with some decision to make or a
problem to solve. One way a person can solve such complex
problems is by using the process of analogical transfer: by
remembering how he or she had solved a similar problem in
the past, deciding if the old problem is somehow similar to
the present one, and adapting the old solution to the new
problem.
Analogical transfer is used not only to derive
solutions to problems, but to make predictions and
strengthen arguments (Holyoak, 1984). Anecdotal reports
abound of major scientific discoveries, such as the
hydraulic model of blood circulation, the planetary model of
atomic structure and the billiard ball model of ideal gases,
derived as a result of noticing and applying an analogy from
a better known area, or domain, to a lesser known domain
(Gick & Holyoak, 1980)
.
As early as the 1900 's there were competing theories
about processes of analogical transfer. Thorndike and
Woodworth (1901) claimed transfer occurred only if identical
elements, such as color, shape or size, were shared between
the old and new tasks. Judd (1908) , on the other hand,
believed that transfer between old and new sets of knowledge
was determined by the extent to which the learner understood
the underlying shared principles between the tasks. Although
Thorndike 's view was the predominant one for many years,
Judd's position is now being championed by many researchers
(Brown, 1989) .
There has been a resurgence of interest in analogical
transfer in problem solving, especially those involving ill-
defined problems. Ill-defined problems have more than one
solution, as compared to well-defined problems that have
algorithmic solution procedures (Gick & Holyoak, 1980)
.
Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983) have found that people
can use analogical processes to solve ill-defined problems,
but they often have difficulty in doing so. In their seminal
work (1980) they used Duncker's radiation problem (1945) as
the ill-defined problem. The problem is:
A man has a malignant, inoperable tumor in his stomach.
He will die if the tumor is not destroyed. There is a
ray that will destroy the tumor, but at the high
intensity needed, the ray will destroy the healthy
tissue it passes through on the way to the tumor. At
lower intensities, the rays are harmless to the healthy
tissue, but will not destroy the tumor. What can be
done to destroy the tumor, using the rays, but
not destroy any healthy tissue?
The solution that Gick and Holyoak define as correct is
a convergence solution- having several low intensity rays
converge on the tumor to destroy it. When adults are given a
previous story that describes an analogous convergence
procedure, approximately 3 0% of those people will solve the
radiation problem. Since about 10% of subjects in the
control condition solve the problem, Gick and Holyoak
estimate that only about 2 0% of the subjects who receive the
base story use that story to help them to solve the problem.
Gick and Holyoak conclude that one of the major problems in
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analogical transfer is the failure to notice the pertinence
of the analogy.
According to many theorists (Brown, 1989; Centner,
1989; Vosniodou, 1989; Gick & Holyoak 1983) several
processes enter into analogical problem solving, in addition
to noticing the potential analogy. Cognitive processing of
the information must take place so that a mental
representation of the source, or prior information, and of
the target, or new problem, will be formed. Representation
involves internalizing the information and transforming it
into a mental model. Representation can involve transforming
the information and so does not have to be veridical. This
representation allows the person to retain the information
and then use the information for any purpose (Trabasso,
Secco & Van den Broek, 1984)
.
Mapping is another step that plays a part in the
analogical process. Mapping is the construction of a set of
correspondences between the representation of the base and
the representation of the target. Finally, the solution,
with any necessary modifications, must be tried (Brown,
1989; Centner, 1989; Holyoak, 1984).
Each process is dependent on the other (Holyoak, 1984)
.
For example, level of representation can affect how the
mapping is established. Since mental representation of the
base and target can be made at many different levels, and in
different forms, how the representation is constructed will
affect the likelihood of being able to map any useful
correspondences between the base and target (Gick & Holyoak,
1983) .
The typical source information in analogical problem
solving is a story that relates a sequence of events
concerning a protagonist's attempt to solve a problem or
reach a goal. This sequence often follows a set pattern that
can be decomposed into component parts including an
indication of a problem to be solved or more generally, any
goal desired, the protagonist's attempt to reach the goal,
obstacles preventing goal attainment, action taken by the
protagonist to overcome these obstacles, and finally, the
outcome of this action (Trabasso & Sperry, 1985)
.
The events of this sequence are causally connected, and
form the structure or meaning of the story. In contrast, the
surface features of the story are the details that play no
causal role in the path of goal attainment (Holyoak &
Thagard, 1989) . Surface features, for example, can be the
exact identity of the protagonist, or any particular detail
that can be changed without changing the meaning of the
story. There can be similarity between stories at either the
level of surface features or structural features or both.
The set of correspondences that is constructed between
the two domains can be formed in many different ways. Each
domain may be thought of as being comprised of a set of
elements. These elements can be mapped, that is a person can
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construct a set of similarities between elements in the
source and target domain. However if a person primarily
forms the representation at this level the representation
will be tied to the concrete, specific features of the
domains. Problem solving using these sets of correspondences
is often not successful as these specific surface features
are usually not causally connected to goal attainment
(Holyoak, 1984)
.
Representation of the source domain can also be
constructed at a more abstract level. The attributes of the
particular elements can be dropped, leaving a more abstract
set of relations. This system of relations is the causal
chain within the domain. If the subject can impose or
transfer the set of relations in the source domain into the
target problem, by recognizing elements within the target as
matching the elements within the relations in the source
domain, the subject can then use the relations in the source
domain to understand how relations between elements in the
target domain function. Centner (1989) believes that mapping
is preferentially and automatically performed using these
systems of relations. Others, such as Holyoak and Thagard
(1989) believe that goal related aspects can influence at
which level representation and mapping occur. Overlap
between these theories occur since causal relations are
often tied directly to goal attainment (Novick, 1988)
.
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In summary, successful analogies are usually
constructed by mapping at the structural features of the
stories, which are the abstract set of relations within the
story. There has been much research on how the features of
the source stories affect subsequent representation, mapping
and use of the information in an analogical problem solving
situation. If the source stories contain a problem, one
possible representation of relations within the source story
is a representation of the general solution procedure that
the protagonist used to solve the problem. This type of
abstract representation is also known as the solution
principle. Gick and Holyoak (1983) found that providing two
source stories, with instruction to compare these stories,
greatly facilitated transfer. They argue this manipulation
allows the person to form a schema of the solution
principle, with the two given source stories given as
examples of the schema. An example of such an abstract
representation might be: "Both stories use the same concept
to solve a problem, which was to use many small forces
applied together to add up to one large force necessary to
destroy the object" (Gick & Holyoak, 1983)
.
A similar result is seen in children's analogical
problem solving. Chen and Daehler (1989) gave 7 year-old
children two source stories that shared few surface
features, but structurally were similar. The children were
asked to compare the stories, and then to solve a problem.
The results, parallelling the adult's, revealed children who
represented the stories at a relatively abstract level, by
comparing the structure that was shared by both stories,
showed much higher rates of transfer than did subjects who
compared the stories in a more concrete fashion. Evidently,
for both children and adults, there is some optimal level of
representation which allows a person to perceive the
underlying structural commonalities between the source
stories, and between the source stories and the target
problem (Trabasso et al, 1984).
Studies evaluating the role of level of representation
in problem solving have utilized stories in which the
structure has been complete. That is, the structure in these
stories have contained all of the key components that would
be necessary to form an analogy that would enable the person
to solve the problem. Gick and Holyoak (1983) found that
adults who had formed a complete abstract representation
showed better problem solving performance than subjects who
had an incomplete abstract representation. A complete
representation contains all of the elements of the solution
principle necessary to solve the new problem, while an
incomplete representation would be missing some of these
elements, for example not including the idea of the forces
adding up to destroy the object. Similarly, Brown (1989) has
found that children who remembered all aspects of the goal
8
structure showed higher transfer rates than did children who
only remembered parts of the structure.
Causality of the source stories has also been
manipulated to examine how the various aspects of the base
structure influence performance in transfer situations. For
example, Holyoak and Koh (1987) manipulated the structure of
a base story by changing the constraints of the problem
presented in the base story. In one condition the
constraints in the base story were the same as the
constraints in the problem that the subjects had to solve.
In other cases the constraints of the base and the target
were different. In both cases the actual solution principle
was the same, but the rationale for why the protagonist had
to perform it was different. Holyoak and Koh (1987) found
that when there were similar constraints between the source
stories and target problem, 78% of the subjects solved the
problem as compared to 54% when there were different
constraints. These numbers included both subjects who
spontaneously solved the problem, and those who solved it
after they were given a hint to try to use the base story to
solve the target problem.
Hints are often given to those subjects who initially
fail to solve the problem. Failure may not be a result of
differences in structure, but of failing to access the base.
Hints eliminate the need for subjects to spontaneously
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access the base story because they are simply told that the
source story is relevant.
Centner and her colleagues have performed similar types
of manipulations on the structure of the base information.
Centner and Toupin (1986) varied structure of the base story
by either including or not including a moral, which acted as
causal summary of the base information. Eight to ten year-
old children benefitted in transfer performance when this
summary was included. Centner and Toupin (1986) claim
including the causal summary produces an explicit systematic
structure. A systematic structure enables the subjects to
more easily transfer relational information because,
according to Centner (Centner, 1989; Centner & Toupin, 1986)
analogical mapping is more likely to occur between higher
order relations, or relations of relations, than between
lower order relations or relations between objects.
Chen and Daehler (1992) also manipulated causality in
stories given to children. Stories were composed of the
following elements; intention to solve a problem, action
taken to solve the problem, and a successful outcome. The
children were either given complete stories with all the
elements present or incomplete stories which eliminated
either the intention to solve the problem, or the outcome of
the action, or both of these components. By eliminating
these features the action became an isolated component of
the story, thus varying the degree to which the action was
.
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embedded in the causal structure of the story. Chen and
Daehler (1992) found both 5 and 7 year-old showed better
problem solving performance when they were provided with
stories that had a complete structure, as compared to
stories that just had an isolated action. A similar study,
with adults, showed that when adults received source stories
containing only an isolated action, they performed no better
than subjects who only received irrelevant base information
(Chen, 1991)
.
All of the above manipulations examine the role of
structure of the source stories in somewhat similar ways.
The solution principle is presented explicitly. What has
been varied are the causal antecedents of the solution
principle so as to increase or decrease systematicity
between the base and target. However, it may not always be
necessary to give a specific solution action in order for
the solution principle to be derived from the source
stories. Just how explicit must this solution action be in
order for the solution principle to be transferred from the
source to the target in an analogical problem solving
situation? Must it be described completely in the source
stories, or can higher order relations such as the intention
to solve a problem, a positive outcome and supporting
evidence for the solution action provide a sufficient causal
link to permit subjects to formulate for themselves the
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solution action? The proposed experiment is designed to
provide some information on this question.
Inferences in Reading
One could theorize that the solution principle needs to
be explicitly present in the source information, because the
solution action is the key component for establishing a
representation of a principle that can be successfully
transferred from the source stories to the target problem.
Even though other aspects of structure such as intention or
outcome are given if the solution action is not provided as
such, a person may not be able to solve the problem. The
solution principle is the relation that must be mapped or
transferred from the source domain to the target problem.
However, part of the process of story representation
can include the reader making inferences that add knowledge
beyond what is explicitly given in the text (Warren,
Nicholas & Trabasso, 1979) . Therefore, perhaps it is not
necessary to explicitly provide the solution action for
transfer to occur. By varying the explicitness of
presentation of the solution action in the source story and
therefore the extent to which it is necessary to infer the
solution action, we may learn more about the conditions
under which analogical transfer occurs.
Theories of story representations often focus on the
readers attempt to discover the causal links of that story
(Black & Bower, 1980; Omanson, 1982; Schank, 1975). Many
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theories stress the importance of causal connections between
events in a story for the representation of events in a
story. Causality in a story is always defined in the context
of the situation, as what is causal in one situation may not
be causal in another (Trabasso et al, 1984). Causality can
be defined as When event A causes event B, this means that
A was necessary for B to take place. When event B occurs,
event A was required because if A did not occur, then B
would not have been possible" (Trabasso et al, 1984).
However, sometimes these causal links are not
explicitly given in the text. Inferences, guided by
linguistic and world knowledge, can establish connections
between the events if these links are not stated in the text
(Kemper, 1982) . Inferences can fill in the missing events in
story structures and they can connect elementary events in
the structure with other events to produce higher levels of
organization (Kemper, 1982; Warren et al, 1979).
Adults do seem to make inferences to establish
coherence while reading. When adult readers are given pairs
of sentences their reading times increased as the sentences
decreased in the explicit causal linking (Keenan, Baillet &
Brown, 1984; Myers, Shinjo & Duffy, 1987). Researchers infer
from these results that the reader has reviewed the text in
order to make an inference to maintain coherence, de Groot
and Van der Pal (1989) found similar results when using
short texts of ten to twelve sentences, instead of just
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sentence pairs. Reading time increased for texts that were
not causal, again indicating that readers made the necessary
inferences to maintain coherence.
More disagreement is found on whether there are
developmental differences in children's ability and tendency
to make inferences. There is evidence that elementary school
aged children make inferences, and some studies have found
no developmental differences in the ability to make
inferences between children in grades 2 and 6 (Danner &
Matthews, 1980). Some researchers have found that children
as young as three will make inferences about the causes of
events (Das Gupta & Bryant, 1989)
.
Others have found that younger children are less likely
to make some types of inferences than older children
(Thompson & Myers, 1985). Ackerman (1988) speculates that
young children may be less likely to generate inferences
depending on the tasks and the nature of the stories given.
For example, Johnson and Smith (1981) found that in very
lengthy stories, 46% of children in third grade made
appropriate inferences. When given the same information in
sentence form, so as to reduce irrelevant information, 75%
made the inferences. Other situations where the younger
child may be less likely to make an inference is when there
is less clue support for the inference (Ackerman, 1988)
.
However, most researchers tend to agree on the fact that by
grade 2-3, children can make some inferences. Given that a
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person makes inferences for comprehension, how does this
affect their representation of that material? Goldman and
Varnhagen (1983) have found that when children in grades 2
and 5 were given stories that required inferences to be made
for comprehension, the inferences were later added to the
children's recall of those stories. Similarly, adults
incorporate inferences for goals, plans and action in their
memory representation of stories. When adults were given
stories that suggested certain inferences, and then given a
recognition task for elements found in the story, they
showed a high false alarm rate to elements that would have
been inferred (Seifert, Robertson & Black, 1985)
.
When a person makes inferences, this can allow them to
gain a more thorough understanding of the text than if they
did not make the inference. Inferences can link separate
events in the story and the person can gain knowledge beyond
what is provided. There is even evidence that in some cases
having to make inferences to understand text can improve
memory performance over not having to make inferences.
Keenan, Baillet and Brown (1984) and Myers, Shinjo and Duffy
(1987) presented adult subjects with pairs of sentences that
varied in their degree of relatedness. Both sets of
researchers found that sentences that were moderately
related were recalled the best in a probe- recall task.
Myers et al (1987) hypothesize that this result is obtained
because of elaborative processing. Subjects encode both
explicitly presented concepts and concepts which they
themselves have generated. With moderately related
sentences, there is a high probability that most readers
will generate inferences to connect the sentences, with the
result that their representation will include this
inference. At low levels of relatedness, subjects are less
likely to generate inferences, and at high levels of
relatedness, inferences are not required. Therefore in both
of these cases the representation will be sparser than the
representation of subjects exposed to moderately related
sentences. The elaborations that become part of the
representation of the text can provide additional routes to
target information at the time of recall.
Overview of Experiments
As can be seen from the above research a person can
make inferences about events in stories, and furthermore,
that when a person makes an inference, it can affect the
representation of that material. The present experiment
examined whether the requirement to make an inference also
affected performance in an analogical problem solving
situation. More specifically, the extent to which the
solution action was explicitly described was manipulated.
Other aspects of structure, such as problem orientation and
outcome, were held constant over all conditions.
In this experiment one group of subjects received
source stories in which the action associated with the
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solution principle was explicitly provided. Other subjects
received stories in which the action was not given. In this
later case, subjects must infer the action for themselves.
It was expected that subjects receiving the explicit
version of the stories, which contain the complete solution
principle, would show better performance than those subjects
in the control group, who only received irrelevant
information. Of more interest was whether was a difference
in problem solving performance in subjects in the implicit
condition versus the control condition. Better problem
solving performance from subjects receiving the implicit
solution principle than from subjects in the control
condition would suggest that the action does not have to be
explicitly stated in a source story for that story to be
used in analogical transfer. People would be able to use
information that they have had to infer to solve a problem.
Inferences about the solution principle that subjects
generated would be incorporated into their representation of
the source domain. These inferences would then be just as
available for the subject to use in a mapping process to
form the analogy as information that was explicitly given to
the subject.
Previous researcg has shown that subjects can use some
types of self-generated information in analogical problem
solving. When adults have been asked to generate their own
concrete examples of the abstract principle, they show about
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equal facility in problem solving performance as when they
are provided with the example by the experimenter (Chen,
1991)
.
There is also preliminary evidence that when 7 year-
old children have been given this same type of task, they
can also use their self-generated examples in a transfer
task (Chen, Daehler & Yanowitz, 1991).
Other researchers have also shown that adults can use
self-generated information in analogical transfer. Gick and
Holyoak (198 0) gave subjects a source story with initial
problem constraints and asked the subjects to generate
solutions for this story. Then they were presented with
Duncker's radiation problem and were asked to try to solve
this problem. Gick and Holyoak (1980) found that of subjects
who generated the convergence solution to the source story
41% then solved the radiation problem.
In the experiments conducted so far, subjects were
given some analogical information to start off with, and/or
were specifically asked by the experimenter to generate the
source information. In the present experiment, subjects in
some conditions were not given any specific directions to
generate the action inference. The source stories contain
support that may lead the subjects to make the inference of
action, but the subjects must make the inference for
themselves
.
Subjects in other conditions were asked to make the
inference by answering a question concerning the
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protagonist's action in the story. This demand question
forced subjects to verbalize what they thought the
protagonist's action was in solving the problem. Performance
of subjects receiving both stories that required generation
of the action and questions that encouraged verbalization of
this inference was expected to be better than performance of
control subjects, nearly equal performance as when subjects
receive the action explicitly. The demand manipulation was
included to show that when subjects are forced to make the
inference, they can then use this information in analogical
transfer.
Some subjects who received the explicit versions of the
stories were also asked demand questions. This was done as a
check to see if subjects had represented this information
and to determine the effects of asking these questions on
performance. The demand questions may serve to focus
attention on the solution principle. Such questions could
encourage a subject to review this material and perhaps
contribute to a change in representation. In addition, these
questions could effect noticing process, by emphasizing to
the subjects the importance of the base story. Therefore
subjects who received the demand question could show better
performance overall than subjects who did not receive these
questions.
Comparison of performance between subjects receiving
the explicit solution principle and the implicit solution
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principle was also of interest. Subjects receiving the
implicit solution principle could show a lower level of
problem solving performance than subjects receiving the
explicit solution principle. Subjects receiving the implicit
stories could incorporate generated solution actions in
their representation of the story less frequently than
subjects who receive the explicit story, all of whom have a
chance to incorporate the given action into their
representation
.
Alternatively, subjects could perform equally well in
both the implicit and explicit conditions. Spontaneously
inferred information, in this case the action in the
solution principle, may be equivalent for problem solving
compared to experimenter provided information. However, in
the Gick and Holyoak (198 0) experiment where subjects had to
generate the entire solution principle, performance,
although better than control, was worse than when the
experimenter provided the answer. Gick and Holyoak (1980)
speculated that perhaps the convergence solutions that the
subjects were generating were either not complete or
embedded in other solutions. In the present experiment,
subjects only had to infer the solution action, and there
was support in the story that should bias them to infer the
"correct" action, as defined by the solution principle.
Therefore, these subjects might do as well as subjects who
receive the action as part of the story.
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Both children and adults were used as subjects in these
experiments, since the materials and problems were very
different for the children and the adults, no direct
comparisons of performance were made. Many of the findings
in analogical transfer have either not shown any age
differences, or if there have been differences, these
results can be explained by reference to the knowledge base
rather than by differences in the process of analogical
transfer (Brown, 1990; Brown, 1989; Brown & Kane, 1988). No
specific prediction were made in regard to possible
differences in the performance between the adults and
children and the experiments were considered as
replications. In summary, this experiment dealt with how
explicit base information must be in order for it to be used
in an analogical transfer task. Must all the information be
presented to the subject, or can other cognitive processes,
such as the ability to make inferences, influence the
process of analogical transfer? This experiment may give us
new knowledge of the conditions under which analogical
transfer takes place, and of the role of the person's
cognitive abilities in that transfer process.
21
CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECTS OF GENERATING INFERENCES ABOUT A
SOLUTION PRINCIPLE IN ANALOGICAL TRANSFER WITH ADULTS
Method
Subjects
180 college students from the University of
Massachusetts participated in this study. Subjects received
extra credit in psychology classes for participating.
Subjects were limited to those students who reported that
they had not taken the basic cognitive psychology course
offered by the psychology department. 29 subjects were
dropped from the study because they had heard of the Duncker
radiation problem before participating, 1 subject refused to
complete the study, and 2 subjects did not provide any
recall of the source stories, thus 148 subjects are included
in the analysis.
Design and materials
The experimental design was a 2 (Explicit solution
principle. Implicit solution principle) by 2 (Demand, Non
Demand) plus a control group. The explicit stories gave the
complete solution principle, while the implicit stories did
not give the action in the solution principle. The source
stories involved the protagonist of the stories sending a
force to a target, but an obstacle prevented simply sending
the force en mass. The protagonist must therefore divide the
large force into several smaller forces, to meet at a
22
general needed to send a large army to a fortress, but all
the roads leading to the fortress were set with mines so
that a large group of men traveling over a road would
detonate the mines, but a small group would not. The general
divided his army into several small groups, each taking a
different road so they all met at the fortress without
triggering any mines. The implicit stories eliminated the
dispersion of the forces down different paths and their
subsequent convergence at the target (see Appendix A)
.
The demand variations did not involve a change in the
source stories themselves, but rather in how the subject was
asked to think about the stories. After receiving each
story, subjects in the Demand condition were asked to state
how the protagonist solved the problem. This question forced
the subject to explicitly state the action. If a subject
received implicit stories, this forced him or her to
generate the inference. For subjects who heard the explicit
stories, this question acted as a check on memory of the
action. No question was asked in the Non Demand condition.
Instead, subjects were asked to briefly summarize the story,
ensuring that all subjects spent approximately the same
amount of time processing the stories.
The target problem was a standard form of Duncker's
(1945) radiation problem (see Appendix A) . This problem has
been used in many experiments involving analogical transfer.
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Procedure
The general format of the experiment was to first
present stories to the subjects, and then to present the
problem. No connection was made between the source stories
and the target problem, and subjects were told that the
study contained several different parts. All information was
presented in booklet form, with the pages face down, so
subjects could only see one page at a time, and the
experimenter indicated when to turn the page. All responses
were written down. Small groups of subjects participated at
the same time.
Subjects were given 3 minutes to read the first source
story. Then they were directed to turn over that page, and
on the next page, write as much of the story as they could
remember. Directions at the bottom of this page instructed
subjects to either summarize the story (in the Non Demand
conditions)
,
or to state how the protagonist solved the
problem (in the Demand conditions) . Subjects were allowed up
to 6 minutes for this task. This procedure was repeated for
the second source story.
Subjects then compared the two source stories, and were
given 4 minutes for this task. Following this task, the
subjects were given the target problem. They were directed
to provide up to five different answers to the problem, and
were allowed up to 8 minutes to complete this task. After
this point, subjects completed the rest of the study at
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their own pace. Subjects were asked if the source stories
helped in solving the problem, and rated the amount of help
received. A hint was given that the stories could help them
to solve the problem, and subjects were asked to provide the
best answer possible to the radiation problems, based on
that knowledge.
Results
Summary of Dependent Measures
Dependent measures examined in this study were based on
problem solving performance, memory, and representation. The
first type of measure dealt with the performance on the
Duncker radiation problem. Problem solving performance was
measured both pre and post hint. Subjects were scored as
correct or incorrect on their answer to the problem. Two
observers independently scored the problem solving
performance. Observers agreed on 99% of their judgements on
whether the subject had or had not solved the problem, and
came to a consensus on any disagreements.
A second type of dependent measure involved subject's
representation of the source stories. Subject's comparisons
of the stories were categorized into three levels of
representation; no comparison of solution principle
elements, incomplete comparison of solution principle
elements and complete comparison of solution principle
elements. The author and another observer scored 24 randomly
selected subjects, and agreed on 83% of their
2 5
categorizations on level of comparison. McNemar's test of
correlated proportions (Hays, 1963) showed no differences
between scorers' judgements of categories. The author then
scored the remaining subjects.
Ability to generate the action inference was examined
by response to the demand question of subjects who received
the implicit source stories. Again, two observers scored all
subjects responses, and had a 95% agreement on their
judgment, and again there was no significant difference
between scorers' judgements using correlated proportions.
Any disagreements were resolved by consensus.
Another dependent measure was subject's memory for the
source stories. Memory was scored by breaking down the story
into the components of protagonist, problem facing the
protagonist, obstacle preventing initial goal attainment,
action taken to overcome obstacle, and goal attainment. Two
observers scored all subjects, with a range of 95% to 100%
agreement on presence of story components. Again, observers
came to agreement on any discrepant scores. Element recall
for each subject was assessed by averaging the recall of
each element over the two source stories. Therefore the
possible recall score for each element was 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0.
Group recall was obtained by averaging each subject's
average score.
Finally, subjects were asked to indicate if the source
stories had been helpful to them when solving the problem
26
(yes/no), in addition, subjects responses on a 7 point scale
ranging from 1 (not helpful at all) to 7 (extremely helpful)
were analyzed as a measure of how helpful the source stories
were.
Performance on the Duncker ProhlPm
Table 1 contains the percentage of subjects solving the
problem pre-hint, post-hint and the total problem solving
performance. Examination of the pattern of pre-hint
performance reveals that the percentage of subjects solving
the problem pre-hint was low, ranging from 19% to 0% in the
various conditions. An initial overall maximum likelihood
Chi squared yielded marginally significant differences
between the five groups, 0^(4) = 9.18, £< .1. The maximum
likelihood chi square procedure (Hays, 1963) is used for all
following analyses involving categorical numbers. Pairwise
comparisons revealed differences between the Control
condition and; Explicit Demand, Explicit Non Demand, and
Implicit Non Demand fps< .05) and between Control and
Implicit Demand (e< .1). No significant differences were
found between any of the experimental conditions.
Success on the problem was surprisingly low, even for
subjects who received the explicit stories. The subjects in
the explicit conditions read stories similar to those
stories given in other experiments, conducted at the
University of Massachusetts and elsewhere (Chen & Daehler,
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solution rates of 40- 60% were commonly reported in
experimental conditions, but only 17% of subjects in similar
groups in this study solved the problem. Possible reasons
for this difference are discussed later on, but the
relatively poor performance by subjects in the experimental
groups in this study may have prevented differences between
experimental groups from emerging.
Examination of performance of the subset subjects who
only solved the problem post-hint (Table l) revealed a
fairly similar pattern of results as those reported for pre-
hint solutions. Subjects in the Explicit Demand, Explicit
Non Demand and Implicit Demand all solved significantly more
problems than Control subjects after the hint was given (ps<
.01). Again, there were no differences between any of the
experimental groups.
Total problem solving performance included subjects who
solved the problem both before and after the hint. When the
total problem solving performance was examined (Table 1)
each experimental group outperformed the Control group
performance (ps< .005). However, there was still no
difference between the experimental groups.
Subjects' solutions to the problem were further
examined using a more liberal scoring criterion. In this
case, any answer that mentioned use of multiple low
intensity rays, regardless of how they were employed, was
scored as correct. Although the percentage of correct
29
answers increased using this criterion, ranging from 35% to
7 0%, the pattern of results remains the same as for original
scoring procedure. Therefore, only results using the
original criterion are reported in the following analyses.
Data from the experimental groups were combined to
examine the effects of subjects receiving the explicit or
implicit solution principle, or of being asked how the
protagonists solved the problem. No significant differences
were found between groups receiving the explicit or implicit
solution principle or between groups answering or not
answering the demand questions, before receiving a hint,
after receiving a hint or for total problem solving
performance.
Other Analvses
52% of subjects who solved the problem produced a
complete representation, while only 10% of subjects who did
not solve the problem produced a complete representation
(Table 2)
.
Subjects who solved the problem had a higher
level of representation than those who did not solve the
problem (0^=16.91, p< .001) However, no significant
differences in level of representation between any of the
experimental conditions was seen.
Production of the story elements in the recall task was
examined (Table 3) . As stated before, the data contributed
by each subject for this measure is there average recall of
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3 2
were seen for memory of the protagonist, the problem facing
the protagonist, or the obstacle preventing goal attainment
among the four experimental groups. However, there was a
large difference between subjects' reporting the action
element. Very few subjects who did not receive the action in
the source stories spontaneously added the action to their
recall of the story. Pairwise comparisons between
conditions, using the Bonferroni adjustment (Myers & Well,
1991)
,
showed differences between subjects receiving the
implicit structure as compared to the explicit structure,
Es<.01. There was also a difference in recall of whether
the protagonists solved their problems. Tukey's studentized
range method post hoc tests showed that subjects who
received the implicit story structure had a poorer memory of
the protagonist's success than did subjects who received the
explicit story structure (p< .05).
Demand question answers were examined in a similar way
as recall production. Each subject contributed a score,
averaged over the two source stories ranging from 0 (no
correct answer) to 1 (both answers correct) . Subjects showed
a high proportion of correct answers to the demand question.
Subjects in the Explicit Demand condition showed an average
correct answer rate of .9, while subjects in the Implicit
Demand condition showed an average correct answer rate of
.8. A comparison of these responses revealed no significant
differences in correct answers between subjects who received
33
the explicit solution principle and subjects who received
the implicit solution principle.
Finally, subjects' judgment of the usefulness of the
source stories was examined (Table 4). Subjects in the
experimental conditions recognized that the source stories
did aid them in solving the problem. When asked if the
stories helped them (yes/no)
, maximum likelihood chi squared
procedure revealed that each experimental condition differed
from the control condition (es<.001). Further examination of
this measure revealed that most subjects who solved the
problem reported that the source stories aided them in
arriving at their solution. Surprisingly, many subjects in
the experimental conditions who failed to solve the problem
also said that the stories helped. However, few subjects in
the Control condition claimed the stories aided them.
Subjects also rated the degree to which the stories
helped them in solving the problem (Table 4) . Again, many
subjects in the experimental groups who failed to solve the
problem gave ratings similar to those subjects who did solve
the problem, indicating that subjects who failed to solve
the problem thought the stories helped them in the problem
solving task. However, subjects in the Control group
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Although there were differences between the
experimental groups and the control group, the total number
of subjects who solved the problem was lower than expected
based on previous research. Several differences between
procedures employed in this study and other studies might
partially account for the low level of performance. In this
study, subjects were instructed to "read the stories
carefully, because they were going to be asked to recall as
much of the stories as possible." After each story was
presented, subjects engaged in this recall task. Other
studies have not included this memory task (Gick & Holyoak,
experiment 4, 1983) or have only asked for a brief summary
of the stories (Gick & Holyoak, experiment 5, 1983). In
addition, the Gick and Holyoak (1983) studies and others
(Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Chen, 1991) first presented
both stories and then asked for a brief recall. In this
study the recall of each story was asked for immediately
after the story was given.
These differences in procedure could have affected
performance in two ways. First, a fatigue or motivational
factor may have come into play. By the time subjects came to
the problem solving task of this experiment, they had spent
up to 22 minutes writing. In comparison in Chen (1991) and
Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) subjects spent only about 10
minutes on the reading and recall tasks before receiving the
36
target problem. Therefore, because of the longer time in
this experiment, subjects may have been less motivated to
try to solve the problem. The experimenters noticed that
many subjects did not seem to be actively trying to solve
the problem for the full 8 minutes allotted for problem
solving. Some subjects put down their pens and simply stared
at the experimenter until work on the next section was
allowed.
Second, the emphasis on memorization of the source
information could have introduced a different orientation in
the acquisition phase than that required for the problem
solving phase. Similarity between acquisition processing and
later problem solving tasks can increase problem solving
performance (Adams et al, 1988; Lockhart, Lamon & Gick,
1988; Needham & Begg, 1991). The procedure of presenting one
source story and then having subjects recall the story
before presenting the second source story may have had the
effect of producing memory-oriented representation, rather
than a problem-solving orientation. In other studies, where
both stories were presented one right after the other,
subjects may have been encouraged to process the stories as
a single unit.
Similarity in processing between acquisition of
information and problem solving is assumed to increase
accessibility of the source information. Many researchers
(Brown, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Ross, 1989) have shown
3.7
that accessing source information can be one of the main
sources of difficulty for subjects engaged in an analogical
problem solving task. In this study, after a hint was given
to use the source information, which can help circumvent the
problem of access, more subjects in each of the experimental
groups were able to solve the problem. No subjects in the
Control group were able to solve after hint, indicating that
one of the reasons performance was so low was difficulty in
accessing the relevant source information.
Since the percentage of correct answers was so low,
incorrect answers were examined. The most prevalent
incorrect answer given was to use a medium ray or some
variation of the theme giving more than one ray, but not
correctly specifying how the rays were to be used. These
answers ignore the constraint that rays sufficiently
powerful enough to destroy the tumor would also destroy
healthy tissue. These kinds of answers may help to explain
the surprising finding that among the experimental
conditions, a fairly high percentage of subjects claimed the
stories were helpful, even though they had not solved the
problem.
Many subjects seemed to feel that they had solved the
problem. One aspect of analogical transfer includes the
ability to evaluate a potential analog and to adapt a
solution from that analog. In this study, subjects did not
seem to evaluate the adequacy of their answers. A high
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proportion of subjects felt that the stories helped them in
solving the problem and may have believed that they had
indeed solved the problem. Subjects did not seem to realize
that they were providing an incorrect answer. Although other
studies have not reported this problem, Duncker (1945) and
Gick and Holyoak (1980) showed that producing any one
particular answer to the problem suppresses the ability of
subjects to produce other equally plausible answers. People
generally find the Duncker radiation problem difficult to
solve if not given appropriate analogous information. If the
discrepancy between the acquisition of the source
information and the problem solving attempt blocked or
lessened the ability to notice and retrieve the source
information, many subjects may have been forced to rely on
other resources. If subjects felt that they had generated
the correct answer, other answers may not have been
produced.
Despite the low level of performance, subjects did
benefit from receiving the source information. For the total
percentage solved, each of the experimental groups
outperformed the control group. For subjects who received
the explicit solution principle, this finding is confirmed
by numerous other studies. Subjects who received an implicit
solution principle were also able to use this principle in
the analogical transfer task. Interestingly, there was no
difference in performance between experimental groups.
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Performance did not seem to be affected by whether the
action was supplied by the experimenter or was self-
generated. Subjects did not need to be explicitly presented
the action of the solution principle, but were able to
generate inferences which they could then use in analogical
problem solving.
The fact that there did not seem to be a difference in
the use of experimenter provided or self
-generated knowledge
is different from previous studies that required the
subjects to generate a solution to similar types of
problems. Gick and Holyoak (198 0) found subjects who had to
generate a solution to the source story had lower level of
performance in solving Duncker's radiation problem than
subjects who received complete source stories. Gick and
Holyoak (1980) speculate that solutions subjects generated
were less useful than the experimenter provided solutions.
In the present study, subjects were provided support in the
stories to generate the correct inference, so their
inferences seemed to be as effective as experimenter
provided information.
A complementary finding to the fact that there was no
difference in solution rates between experimental groups is
that there was no difference in level of solution principle
representation between experimental conditions. Level of
representation reflects the ability of subjects to engage in
successful analogical transfer (Brown, 1989; Chen & Daehler,
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1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983). In this study the majority of
subjects who solved the problem produced a complete
representation of the solution principle. Although
conclusions are limited by the overall poor performance, the
finding that there was no difference in level of
representation between experimental conditions provides
support for the claim that subjects can represent and use
self
-generated and experimenter provided information with
equal facility. Once the subjects had represented the source
information, they were able to proceed with constructing a
set of correspondences between the source stories and the
target problem. Mapping did not seem to be affected by how





THE EFFECTS OF GENERATING INFERENCES ABOUT A
SOLUTION PRINCIPLE IN ANALOGICAL TRANSFER WITH CHILDREN
Method
Subjects
139 second and third grade students participated in
this study. 47 students were from Mark's Meadow Elementary
school, Amherst, Massachusetts. 92 students were
individually recruited to participate at the Child Study
Center in Springfield, Massachusetts. 2 subjects refused to
participate, 1 subject was discovered to have a learning
disability and 2 subjects were dropped because of equipment
failure, so data from 134 subjects are included in the
following analyses. The mean age was 94 months (8.5 years)
and the range was 77 to 118 months.
Design and Materials
The experimental design was the same as in Experiment
1. Briefly, a 2 (Explicit structure of solution principle vs
Implicit structure of solution principle) by 2 (Demand vs
Non Demand) factorial design plus a Control group was used.
The explicit stories contained the complete solution
principle of connecting two short objects to make a long
tool that could reach a goal object. For example, a cat
wanted to reach a feather in a tree. In order to reach the
feather, she had to combine a stick and a branch to make an
42
object long enough to reach the feather (see Appendix B)
.
The implicit stories eliminated the combining action
contained in the solution principle. The control stories
contained only irrelevant information. The demand
manipulation was similar to the one used for the adults.
Subjects in Demand conditions were asked how the
protagonists solved their problems. Subjects in the Non
Demand condition were asked to give the main idea of the
story.
The target problem was similar to one used by Chen and
Daehler (1989, 1992, Chen, 1991). The problem required the
subject to retrieve a ball from the bottom of a tall
cylinder, without turning the cylinder upside down. The
cylinder was located on a table along with a number of other
common items including a tinkertoy stick and a spoon, and a
number of irrelevant props including a toy key, a toy
hammer, a S-shaped hook, toy scissors, a wooden block, a
metal pan, toy stick of butter, a cup, and a box. The
problem could only be solved by connecting the stick and the
spoon together, which made a tool long enough to retrieve
the ball.
Procedure
The general format of the task consisted of presenting
two source stories to the children and then presenting the
transfer problem. The entire experimental situation was
videotaped.
The first source story was read and the child recalled
as much of the story as he or she remembered. Experimenter's
prompts were limited to general encouragement except when
the child did not produce any recall within approximately 20
seconds, if no response was initiated by the child at this
point, he or she was asked "what did (protagonist's name)
do?". A child who produced any recall of the story after
this point was given full credit for whatever was produced.
After recall, in the Demand condition, the child was asked
how the protagonist solved the problem. If he or she could
not answer this general question, the questions became
increasingly more specific, by asking how the protagonist
used the two objects to retrieve the goal object. Subjects
in the Non Demand condition were asked to tell what they
thought the main idea or important point of the story was so
as to equate the time spent on the story with the time spent
in making inferences by children in the demand conditions.
This same format was followed for the second story. After
children had received both stories, they were asked to
indicate the similarities between the two stories (e.g. "Was
anything the same in those two stories? Was anything alike
in the stories, how were things alike?")
.
The target problem was introduced as "now we are going
to do something different". 200 seconds were allowed to
solve the problem. If the child did not solve the problem
after 200 seconds, a hint was given to the child to "think
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about the stories. That could help you solve this problem."
and another 100 seconds was allowed for problem solving. If
the child still did not solve the problem, they were given
another hint to "think about what the genie did to solve the
problem and what the cat did to solve her problem", and
another 60 seconds were allowed. Children in the Control
group who did not solve the problem within 200 seconds were
told one time that the stories could help them, but emphasis
was put on "just keep trying". They were allowed another 160
seconds to try to solve following this information.
Results
Summary of Dependent Measures
Several types of dependent measures were examined.
Problem solving measures included the percentage of subjects
who correctly solved the problem pre-hint and post-hint, and
time to solve the problem pre-hint and time to solve post-
hint. An additional measure was the total percentage of
subjects who solved the problem and time required to solve.
Two researchers independently scored 14 subjects on these
measures (8 at the beginning of scoring, and 6 about halfway
through scoring)
. There was 100% agreement for solving the
problem, and the Pearson product moment correlation was .99
for time to solve. One researcher then scored the remaining
subjects.
Other measures involved subject's representation of and
memory for the source stories. Level of representation was
45
based on the comparisons of the source stories and scored
using the same scale developed for the adult's
representation scores as described in Experiment 1 (no
comparison of solution elements, incomplete comparison of
solution elements, complete comparison of solution
elements)
.
Scorers agreed on 91% of the classification for
14 subjects and one assistant scored the remaining subjects.
McNemar's test of correlated proportions showed no
differences between category judgements.
Subject's memory for the source stories was also
examined. Again, as in Experiment 1, source stories were
broken up into story elements, including protagonist,
problem facing the protagonist, obstacle preventing initial
goal attainment, action taken, and goal attainment.
Subject's recall was judged for the presence of each
element. Agreements ranged from 82%- 96% for 14 subjects on
the various elements, and again one assistant scored the
remaining subjects.
Another measure examined the answers that subjects gave
to the demand question. There was 100% agreement on answers
to the demand question from 18 randomly selected subjects
who received the demand question, and one observer scored
the remaining subjects. Again MacNemar's test of correlated
proportions showed no differences between category
judgements between the two scorers.
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Performance on t,he Problpm Solving T;.gv
Preliminary analyses showed no difference for gender,
or between the two different sample populations on any of
the aforementioned measures.
Table 5 shows the percentage of subjects who solved the
problem pre-hint, post-hint and total problem solving
performance measures. Considering first the performance of
subjects pre-hint, the majority of subjects in all
conditions solved the problem. As seen in Table 5, there
were no significant pairwise differences between any of the
experimental groups and the Control group for solving the
problem pre-hint. There was also no difference between
groups for time to solve the problem pre-hint, as seen Table
6. Time to solve was examined by either assigning a maximum
value of 2 00 seconds for subjects who did not solve the
problem (Chen and Daehler, 1992, 1989, Chen, 1991), thereby
permitting all subjects to be included in the analysis, or
by examining only the times of the subset of subjects who
did solve the problem. No significant differences were found
between groups for time to solve the problem pre-hint using
either time measure.
A different pattern of results emerged when examining
post hint performance (Table 5) for the subset (n = 54) of
subjects who did not solve the problem before the first hint
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problem only after the second hint, so any separate analysis
of post hint performance is limited to performance after the
first hint. Control group post-hint 1 performance is taken
as the percentage of subjects who solved the problem in up
to 100 seconds after the hint was given. This ensures an
equal time period for post-hint 1 for both experimental and
control groups. The Control group differed significantly
from the Explicit Non demand {G^il)= 4.1 e< .05), and the
Implicit Demand (G^d) =4.9, e< .05) groups for percentage
of problem solving. Performance in the Explicit Demand and
the Implicit Non demand conditions did not differ from the
Control condition. Time to solve post hint 1, was not
significantly different between any of the groups (Table 6)
.
Again, time was examined both by including all of the
subjects and assigning a maximum time to non solvers, or by
including only those subjects who solved.
Since subjects were given two hints to encourage
problem solving, total problem solving performance examines
whether subjects solved the problem at all, either pre-hint
or after either of the two hints. No differences were found
between groups on total problem solving performance for any
of the problem solving measures (Table 5 and Table 6)
.
Although there were few differences between the
experimental and the control groups, analyses were performed
to see if there were any indications of effects of
experimental variables within the experimental groups. There
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was no difference in the percentage of problems solved as a
function of structure or of answering the demand questions,
using the maximum likelihood chi squared method. Likewise,
there were no differences on time to solve, both pre and
post hint using the analysis of variance method on the
2 (explicit action, implicit action) by 2 (demand, non
demand) factorial design.
The overall high level of performance of subjects in
the Control group was surprising. A comparison of the ages
of subjects in this study with the ages of subjects that
participated in studies using similar problems (Chen &
Daehler 1989, 1992), revealed that subjects in this study
were approximately a year older and the age range was
substantially greater. Older children were deliberately
selected for this study to ensure ability to make the
inferences required by the implicit conditions. As a result
the problem may have been too easy for most subjects. In
this study, 59% of the control subjects were able to solve
the problem before a hint was given. In comparison, only 20-
3 0% of control subjects in the previously mentioned studies
solved similar problems. Therefore, the data for the
youngest third of the subjects included in this study (n =
43) were selected for further analysis. The mean age of
these subjects, 86 months, more closely matched the ages of
subjects in other studies.
51
The results for this subgroup of children, summarized
in Table 1, also revealed few differences. Subjects in the
Explicit Demand group showed a higher percentage of problem
solved than all of the other experimental groups and the
Control group, using the maximum likelihood chi squared
procedure (es < .05) and solved the problem faster than any
other group, using Tukey's post hoc comparison (ps < .05).
Time to solve, for this and the following analyses, included
a maximum assigned time for subjects who did not solve. This
procedure took into account those subjects who did not solve
the problem to maximize the number of subjects in each
condition.
Again, although few differences were revealed between
the experimental groups and the control group, problem
solving performance was examined to see if there was any
differential effect of the experimental manipulations.
Percentage of pre-hint problem solving was examined, as a
function of structure and of receiving a demand question, by
combining over groups. Subjects receiving a demand question
solved more problems than subjects who did not answer any
questions (0^(1) = 3.75, e< .05). No significant difference
as a function of receiving the implicit or explicit story
structure was found. An analysis of variance was performed
on the time to solve pre-hint using the 2 (Explicit solution
principle. Implicit solution principle) by 2 (Demand, Non
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significant main effect favoring those subjects who received
the explicit solution principle (M = loi seconds) versus
those subjects who heard the implicit solution principle (M
= 147 seconds, e< .05). Subjects who answered a demand
question also solved the problem faster (M = 94 seconds)
than subjects who stated the main point of the stories (M =
156 seconds, e< .05). No significant interaction was seen.
No difference was found on total problem solving
performance as a function of structure of the source stories
or answering the demand questions. When the total time to
solve, both for subjects who solved both pre and post hint
is analyzed, a somewhat different pattern of results
emerged, as compared to the pattern of time before hint. In
this case, groups receiving the explicit solution principle
structure did not differ from groups receiving the implicit
structure. However, subjects who answered a demand question
still solved significantly faster (M = 96) versus those who
did not answer this question (M = 211, p< .005).
Other Analyses
An initial analysis comparing level of representation
of the stories for subjects who solved the problem versus
those who did not solve the problem revealed a significant
difference between these groups (G^(2) =5.94, £< .05) 72% of
the subjects who solved the problem produced a complete
representation, while only 33% of the subjects who did not
solve the problem produced a complete comparison (Table 2)
.
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However, no difference was found in level of representation
between subjects who received the explicit solution
principle versus subjects who received the implicit solution
principle. There was a difference in level of representation
between subjects who answered the demand question and those
who did not (g2(2) = 8.109, p < .05). 81% of subjects who
answered the demand question produced a complete
representation, while only 39% of subjects in the Non Demand
conditions produced a complete representation.
Finally, subjects" memory of the story elements was
examined (Table 8). As with the adult's production, each
subject contributed an score averaged over the two source
stories. A series of comparisons, using the Bonferroni
adjustment, revealed no differences between any of the
groups for recall of the protagonist, the problem that the
protagonist faced, the obstacle preventing goal achievement,
or the fact that the goal was achieved. However, there was a
difference in production of the action element. Production
of the action element accurately reflected whether the
subject had heard the action in the stories. Few subjects in
the implicit conditions spontaneously added the action
inference to their recall. Comparisons showed that subjects
who received the explicit story structure produced the
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The type of structure of the solution principle did not
affect subjects, correctly answering the deinand question.
Again, each subject contributed an answer averaged over the
two source stories. Subjects in the Explicit Demand
condition produced an average score of i, while subjects in
the Implicit Demand produced an average score of .8.
Discuss i nn
In general, the problem used in this study was solved
by the majority of subjects. Even many of the younger
subjects in the Control group had high levels of solving.
The majority of subjects were obtained by recruiting parents
to come to a child study center. This procedure may have had
the effect of selecting a population of children that came
from a family environment that placed emphasis on learning
and discovery. Many parents indicated that their children
loved puzzles or were at or near the top of their class
academically.
Examination of the post hint 1 performance of the
subset of subjects that did solve the problem before a hint
was given revealed differences between conditions. A hint
can help to overcome accessing difficulties, so some
children evidently had difficulty in accessing the source
stories. Children who heard the Explicit Non demand and
Implicit Demand stories showed a higher level of problem
solving than children in the Control group after a hint was




than the Control group, which was given an equal amount of
extra time, it was not just a matter of extra time needed by
these subjects. Rather, subjects in these experimental
conditions could now use the source information in a way
that they could not do before a hint was given.
Even for the youngest third of the subjects, there
few advantages of being in an experimental condition
compared to the control group, so any conclusions of effect
of the experimental variables must be considered cautiously.
However, structure of the stories did seem to affect their
ability to use the stories. For example, the children who
received the complete solution principle solved the target
problem faster than those who had to infer the solution
principle.
Encouragement to make the inference about the solution
principle led to increased ability to use the information.
Young children who received a demand question again
performed faster and had a higher percentage of correct
solutions than those who did not answer such a question. For
children who heard incomplete stories, the demand question
forced them to generate the solution principle. These young
children could generate the solution action if directly
asked, and indeed there was no difference in the frequency
of correct answers for the demand conditions between these
subjects and subjects who were reporting their memory of the




solving performance did not differ whether the principle
self
-generated or experimenter provided. The demand
questions may have helped focus attention on the soluti,
principle. Answering the demand question also seemed to
affect subject's representation of the story. The majority
of subjects who answered the demand question then went on to
produce a complete representation, which may help explain
this group's overall high level of problem solving
performance. Mapping of the solution principle relation from
the source stories to the target problem could take place
with this complete representation. Subjects could then use
this relation to solve the problem. Again, it did not seem
to make a difference whether this complete representation
was formed from information that was given to the subjects
or from information that was generated by the subjects.
Another procedure that encouraged the younger children
to generate the action of the solution principle was a hint
to use the story. When total time to solve the problem,
(including children who solved post hint), was examined, no
difference was seen in time to solve between children who
heard the explicit solution principle versus those who heard
the implicit solution principle. The hint may have
encouraged the subject to generate the necessary inferences
about the solution principle. When the child tried to map
the source information to the target information, he or she
may have generated the necessary inferences about the
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solution principle that would complete the mapping. Again,
Whether information was experimenter provided or self




Although these experiments did not yield a strong
pattern of results, some general conclusions can be gleaned
from them. Both children and adults seem to be able to use
self
-generated information in analogical problem solving,
although again floor and ceiling effects (for adults and
children, respectively) prevent any unqualified conclusions.
Source information did not have to be explicitly given for
that information to be useful in problem solving. The
ability to make inferences about the action of the solution
principle can compensate for a lack of detail. When the
subjects had generated the inference, they could incorporate
it into their representation. Construction of the analogy
did not seem to be dependent on whether subject's had
explicitly received the solution principle or had generated
the solution principle, once a complete representation had
been produced.
Although it is difficult to directly compare the
results for children and adults because of the differing
types of problems and source information given, one can
speculate on the different patterns of findings that were
obtained for the two groups. The subset of younger children
solved the problem faster if they were given the explicit
structure as compared to the implicit structure, although
there was no difference in percentage of problems solved.
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This difference in time to solve disappeared once a hint was
given. For adults, on the other hand, there was no
difference in performance for receiving explicit versus
implicit solution principles, and this pattern did not
change after a hint was given.
Perhaps this developmental change is the result of
improved ability or change in the likelihood of generating
such inferences. Again, any such conclusions must be
considered speculatively since two different measures, time
to solve and percentage of solving are being compared. Young
children may have difficulty in making such inferences,
while older children and adults may make inferences more
spontaneously
.
Differences in ability to generate or use inferences
may also be reflected in the way the source stories were
represented. When asked to find similarities between the
source stories, children who answered the demand question
were able to produce a more complete representation of the
solution principle than children who did not answer this
question. Children who received the implicit solution
principle had to be encouraged to generate the inference,
which they could then add to their representation. However,
for adults, answering the demand questions about the
solution principle did not seem to have any effect on their
level of representation.
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More work needs to be done to explore the hypothesis
that there is a difference between children and adults in
generating and using inferences in an analogical transfer
task, by using materials that can directly compare adult and
child performance. A mathematical or scientific source
domain could be used, which differed in the sophistication
of the language, but included the same general principles to
be transferred.
Additional work also needs to be done addressing if the
difficulty of generating the inference affects performance.
In this study, most subjects were able to generate the
required inference when asked to by the demand condition.
Asking subjects to generate a less obvious inference may
affect their representation and use of that information.
Subjects receiving this type of source information may do
comparatively worse in an analogical problem solving task.
However, there are indications from previous work on
inferences in reading (Keenan et al, 1984; Myers et al,
1987) that in some cases generating inferences improves
performance on memory tasks. A similar result could be seen
in a transfer task. Subject's representation of this type of
information may be different in a to allow for increased
transfer. New ways of assessing representation may lead to
finding differences in representation of self generated
versus experimenter provided information. Although the
present study did not show any advantages for self-generated
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information, perhaps manipulations of the difficulty of




THE SOURCE STORIES AND TARGET PROBLEM USED IN
EXPERIMENT 1
SOURCE STORY: REBEL GENERAL
A small country was ruled by a cruel dictator from ^fortress situated in the middle of the country A rebe?
capture ?hf?o ^^e dictator, so le needed to
^Stress but ?hrn^\r^^^ ^^f^ "^^"^ l^^^i^g to the
mines on' e^^h .5%^ ^ ^^^^ dictator had plantedac of these roads. These mines were set so that asmall group of men could pass over safely, bu? a large army
v??laa^f "
the mines and destroy the neighboring^
^
illages The rebel general needed all of his large army tocapture the fortress, but he did not want to destroy theneighboring villages. The rebel general had an idea how hecould use the fact that there were many roads that led tothe fortress
.
[He would divide hi^ ^^m, into ^^^n around. ;,nrl
send each group down a different road so that the Pni-ir-^
army would arrive together at the fortress at the "^^^^^
ItZVl ''f'^i general tried his idea and he got his wholearmy to the fortress. He was able to capture the fortress
without destroying any of the neighboring villages
*the sentence in brackets is included in the explicit
version, not included in the implicit version
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SOURCE STORY: RED ADAIR
an enormous quanti?y"^r^ir^aofaay"'F^^^f^ ^"^""^
tire could be extinguished if a huge amount of fire
wen hTi^ ^""P^^ on ?he base ^f thell He ad hoses of all different sizes to work with The
auantT?v"n? f""^^ " ^° ^^^-^ the Targ;
?or
oam necessary to put out the fire was too big
knock dowi''^ P?^''^^^ ^°
control, it would move around andn all the surrounding equipment. Each of the other
5hen%ed\^r ^""^l^ ^^i^^^^ necessary amount of foam,
^^nv t "-"^It ^u"' the fact that he had
^h^L r hoses. [Each of his men wonl H nse a small hn.^ t-ns oot foam at the base of the fi re
, so that ^ l^ rae enoughquantity of foam would reach the fire all at once:*! Podtried his Idea and enough foam fell on the base of the wellto extinguish the blaze, without causing any other damage.
*sentence in brackets is included in the explicit version.
not included in the implicit version.
TARGET PROBLEM: DUNCKER RADIATION PROBLEM
A doctor in a health center is faced with a patient who
has a malignant tumor in his stomach. It is impossible to
operate on the patient but unless the tumor is destroyed the
patient will die. There is a machine that emits a king of
ray, similar to am X-ray that will destroy the tumor. If the
ray is given at a high intensity this will destroy the
tumor, but it will also destroy the healthy tissue around
the tumor. A lower intensity ray will not destroy the
healthy tissue, but it will not destroy the tumor. Using the
rays, what type of procedure might be used to destroy the
tumor and at the same time not destroy the healthy tissue?
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APPENDIX B




^^^""^ ""^^ ^ ^^"^^ lived in a bottle. He liked
top of'iL W^f tricks, one day the gen?; wL on ^his bottle practicing magic. He needed to use hisspecial box, but then he saw that it was in the bottom ofdeep well. The genie could not reach the bSx ?he genTe
Then he found a pole, but it was also too short to reach thebox. The genie had an idea how he could use the cane S?ththe pole to reach the box f The aeni^ tied th^ pole and thncane together to make one long pnio*] n^y,^ g-nir tried hizIdea and now he could reach his special box
*sentence in brackets is included in th^ explicit v^r^inn
not included m the implicit version .
SOURCE STORY: CAT
Once there was a cat who saw a pretty feather. She
wanted to get the feather to give to her kittens, but thefeather was caught up high in a tree and she could not reach
It. The cat looked around and saw a stick on the ground. She
tried to use the stick to get the feather, but the stick was
too short. Then she saw a branch, but it was also too short
to reach the feather. The cat had an idea how to use the
stick with the branch reach the feather. [ The cat tied the
stick and the branch together to make one long branch. ]* She
tried her idea and now she could reach the feather
*sentence in brackets is included in the explicit version,
not included in the implicit version .
TARGET STORY PROBLEM:
Jennifer was a seven-year old girl. She had lots of
friends. One day she was playing a game with some of her
friends. They wanted to play another game, but one of her
friends had dropped the ball they needed into a tall jar.
Here is the jar, and here is the ball and here are all the
things that they could use to get the ball out. Now can you
help Jennifer and get the ball out? You can use any or all
of these things here on the table to help you, but you can't
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